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This paper explores the largest steel producer in Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
it shifted from a state-owned company to a foreign-owned private company. 
The impact of the transition on industrial relations, effect of new management 
on employment conditions within the company and the changing role of trade 
unions is explored. The extent to which the findings can be considered a typi-
cal consequence of the inexorable encroachment of capitalism and privatisation 
across Eastern Europe is considered. The paper commences with brief sum-
mary of the historical and political context of the transitional economies. This 
is followed by a brief history of the steel industry in general, and in Yugoslavia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, detailing the main features of in-
dustrial relations. The background to the specific case study is then presented, 
providing a short history of Mittal Steel and its restructuring challenges in the 
transitional post-communist period. This provides the foundation for the analy-
sis, which explores the impact of privatisation on industrial relations in the 
company, looking in particular at the effect of new management and its culture, 
and the concomitant effects on employment contracts, working conditions and 
the changing role of trade unions. The paper concludes with a discussion of the 
extent to which the transformations can be explained by the various theories of 
post-communist capitalism.
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Introduction
A broad range of studies has explored industrial relations systems in South 
Eastern Europe in the context of crisis and institutional change.* This paper 
seeks to contribute by exploring the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
one of the six independent republics to emerge from the breakup of Yugo-
slavia, and one which has so far received relatively little scholarly attention. 
An understanding of the historical and political context of this country 
is essential to understanding the current state of its industrial relations, as 
each of the six new countries has pursued a very different path in its tran-
sition from a socialist to a market economy. The different trajectories of 
development stem from a range of internal and external factors that char-
acterise the different geographical regions, factors that create unique critical 
junctures through which political, economic and social orders are created 
and (re)negotiated. These factors prompt important questions relating to 
the impact of privatisation on state-owned companies, especially given the 
legacy of Yugoslavian self-management. Using a case study of the larg-
est steel producer in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the transition from a state-
owned company to a private company owned by foreigners is detailed, and 
the impact of the transition on industrial relations and employment condi-
tions within the company is explored. The extent to which the findings can 
be considered a typical consequence of the inexorable encroachment of 
capitalism and privatisation across Eastern Europe is considered.
The paper commences with brief summary of the historical and politi-
cal context of the transition economies. This is followed by a brief history 
of the steel industry in general, and in Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina in particular, detailing the main features of industrial relations. 
The background to the specific case study is then presented, providing a 
short history of Mittal Steel and its restructuring challenges in the transi-
tional post-communist period. This provides the foundation for the analy-
sis, which explores the impact of privatisation on industrial relations in 
the company, looking in particular at the effect of new management and 
its culture, and the concomitant effects on employment contracts, working 
conditions and the changing role of trade unions. Data have been collected 
from a variety of primary and secondary sources and include the analysis 
* We are grateful to two anonymous referees for useful and constructive comments and 
suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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of press reports and other publicly available information, along with inter-
views with key stakeholders from the local and national trade union. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of the main issues raised, and the extent 
to which the transformations can be explained by the various theories of 
post-communist capitalism.
The transition from a socialist to a market economy and indu-
strial relations
Following the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the transition from a 
socialist to a market economy across the former communist world, we have 
witnessed the accelerated formation of a global production system as well 
as regional and national configurations of the global political economy. 
This process, however, has been far from uniform, nor has it been smooth. 
Attempts have been made to analyse the different trajectories of eco-
nomic development resulting from the interplay between the range of fac-
tors characterising each of the regions of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 
although comparisons are hindered by the limited availability of relevant 
information / data. Recent attempts to map, order and analyse these devel-
opments in post-communist economies draw on the “variety of capitalisms” 
(VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001) that identifies two broad types 
of political economies in the advanced capitalist world. These are “liberal 
market economies” (LMEs), exemplified by the Anglo-American business 
model, and “coordinated market economies” (CMEs) exemplified by Ger-
man and Swedish business models. However, the use of these models of 
developed capitalism to analyze emerging post-communist capitalisms has 
proved inadequate (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007; Lane, 2005; Williams and 
Nadin, 2011).
The most important methodological problem is that the original VoC 
concept assumed the pre-existence of established and stable national institu-
tions managing the economy, either more like the LME or the CME type of 
capitalism. Such institutions had not existed in the transitional economies 
(Bohle and Greskovits, 2007). Some scholars have tried to modify the VoC 
model by introducing the “hybrid” variety of capitalism as a combination 
of LME and CME (see for instance Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007), 
which would be appropriate to use in studying transitional economies. But 
this does not resolve the above-mentioned methodological problem (Myant 
and Drahokoupil, 2012).
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Furthermore, Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) tried to enlarge the VoC 
by a third variety of capitalism, “dependent market economy” (DME). The 
DME is based on institutional complementarities between skilled yet cheap 
labour on the one hand and the provision of capital and technology via 
foreign direct investment (FDI) on the other. Thus, integration with more 
developed countries is secured through dependency on the foreign owner-
ship of major industrial capacities and financial institutions (Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2012).
A final type of capitalism that is relevant for this paper is described as 
“wild capitalism”, although it falls outside the traditional VoC model. This 
concept has been employed for studying the less successful transition pro-
cesses in CEE countries (see Bruner, 2002, for the case of Russia; Harper, 
2006, for the case of Hungary; Upchurch and Marinković, 2011, for the case 
of Serbia). Wild capitalism is defined as a process of degradation of values 
and institutions of social solidarity, reduction of labour rights, deregulation 
of economic activity, corruption, weak civil society, and a weak state unre-
sponsive to labour union claims (cf. Upchurch and Marinković, 2011).
Regardless of the varieties of post-communist trajectories, it is possible 
to identify some common features of emerging post-communist political 
economies that structure the trends in industrial relations. These are: de-
industrialisation, increasing unemployment and socio-economic inequality 
coupled with a concomitant informalisation of the economy, a dual and 
segmented labour market, and precarious work and migration pressures 
(Likic-Brboric, 2011; Williams and Nadin, 2011).
This is the general context in which the changes of industrial rela-
tions and the role of trade unions in transitional economies need to be 
observed. Trade union weakness in the former CEE countries has often 
been explained primarily by their communist legacies, both institutional 
and ideological (Ost, 2000; Crowley and Ost, 2001). However, the “legacy 
of the past” is not the same in all CEE countries. The Yugoslavian model 
of socialism was quite different from other CEE countries, thanks to the 
self-management and the social ownership of companies. Self-management 
provided political power relations such that trade unions had considerable 
influence, especially at the company level, while the institution of social 
ownership made workers identify with their companies, giving a feeling 
of attachment and often resulting in higher productivity (Stanojević, 2003; 
Grdešić, 2008: 138). Admittedly, the dynamics between implementation of 
	 Zoran	Slavnić	et	al.:	From	Workers’	Self-management	in	Socialism...,	Revija	za	sociologiju	43	(2013),	1:	31–55
 35
the Yugoslav self-management model on the one hand and market liber-
alisation, on the other hand, had not been equally efficient in all Yugoslav 
republics, contingent on their historically configured structural and cultural 
traits (Likić-Brborić, 2003).
There have been opposite appraisals of the legacy of Yugoslav self-
management on emerging industrial relations and worker empowerment in 
the post-communist former Yugoslavia successor states. While Arandarenko 
(2001) pointed to workers’ self-management as the main explanatory factor 
of labour weakness in Serbia, Stanojević (2003) questioned this assessment 
by pointing to its positive role in Slovenian post-communist transformation. 
Grdešić (2008), for one, attempted to cross this divide in terms of respec-
tive political elites’ choices at the moment of critical juncture (Collier and 
Collier, 1991), i.e., times of extreme uncertainty in the late 1980s and war 
during the 1990s.
As regard Bosnia and Herzegovina, this war meant not only terrible 
human and material destruction but also devastation of the industrial, ener-
gy and communications infrastructure of the country. After the war, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was confronted with the challenge of making three sorts 
of transition: from socialism to capitalism, from war to peace, and from 
contested to consolidated statehood (Donais, 2002). Rapid and consequent 
privatisation was proposed by the so-called international community, led 
by USAID, as a most effective medicine for both democratisation and eco-
nomic recovery and development. What happened, however, was protracted 
socio-economic and political instability, marked by ethnic party politics and 
corruption, high unemployment rates and weak trade unions. The overall 
result of political and economic reforms was a type of capitalism that most 
closely resembled the “wild capitalism” described above.
Today, more than twenty years from the inception of “transition” in 
CEE countries, these explanations of trade union weakness seem less rel-
evant. There is a growing consensus that the complex processes of transi-
tion and their consequences cannot be separated from the broader forces 
of globalisation (Upchurch, 2009; Upchurch and Marinković, 2011). It is 
clear that the role of International Financial Institutions, the IFIs (the World 
Bank and IMF), EU and other relevant international actors promoting the 
neoliberal recipe of transition and industrial restructuring was at least as 
important as the legacy of the past. Governments have continuously been 
encouraged to further privatisation of publicly-owned companies and ser-
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vices and deregulation of labour markets, resulting in additional marginali-
sation of trade unions and increased polarisation between the highest and 
lowest incomes (Upchurch, 2009). Previously strategic industrial sectors 
such as the steel industry have become an easy target for acquisitions by 
multinational companies (MNCs) from emerging economies, such Indian 
Mittal Steel, and an important instrument in their global expansion strate-
gies, resulting in global industrial restructuring and related transformation 
of industrial relations further exacerbating the position of labour. In the 
next sections we present the main features of the global restructuring of the 
steel industry with a focus on the ArcelorMittal Steel and its acquisitions 
in CEE countries. We then present the fate of the Yugoslav steel industry 
in order to situate the case of ArcelorMittal in Zenica. ArcelorMittal has, 
without doubt, demonstrated structural power and capacity to internalise 
and reshape industrial relations in the steel sector across different locations, 
involving governance at local, regional and global levels. Exploring its im-
pact may contribute to a better understanding of post-communist transfor-
mations that attend the interplay between international and intra-national 
dynamics and mechanisms of change (Pickel and True, 2002).
Global restructuring of the steel industry and industrial relations
The steel industry has traditionally been characterised by state-ownership/
support/protection and a primary national focus, regardless of the political 
system in the particular host countries (Bacon and Blyton, 2000). Reasons 
for this include the strategic importance of the steel industry, combined 
with factors such as high capital costs, the need for additional investments 
in infrastructure and a notorious vulnerability to changes in the economic 
cycle. This is also why the development of multinational companies in this 
sector has been inhibited, protecting the steel industry from globalisation, 
unlike other industrial sectors. Over the past three decades, however, the 
steel industry has undergone radical changes in terms of intensive priva-
tisation, internationalisation and the employment of new technologies re-
quiring new kinds of skill and changes in the organisation of production 
(Fairbrother, Stroud and Coffey, 2004b; Dawley, Stenning and Pike, 2008; 
Stroud, 2010). Helping to fuel these changes is the less capital-intensive 
nature of steel production, as well as the removal of international trade 
barriers (Bacon and Blyton, 2000). In addition, most of the national steel 
companies were badly managed when state-owned, constituting as they did 
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large, rigid, inefficient and unprofitable economic actors. Today, the world 
steel market is becoming increasingly dominated by privately owned multi-
national companies.
This has, of course, had far-reaching consequences for the trade un-
ions. Their power and position/role in industrial relations was challenged 
from different directions and by different actors and factors. Privatisation 
and internationalisation taking place during the past three decades have 
been worldwide processes resulting in the world steel industry being con-
centrated in a small number of large MNCs. Traditionally, the most impor-
tant partners of trade unions in the steel industry were national Govern-
ments, which under the new circumstances, lost their importance (Bacon 
and Blyton, 2000). New international owners were not so reluctant to get 
rid of less profitable plants than previous owners, which, combined with 
lower global demand for steel during the 1980s and 1990s, resulted in 
many plants being closed, as well as a radical reduction of manpower 
in the remaining plants. The work force in the EU’s steel industry was 
reduced by almost 40% during this period (Fairbrother, Stroud and Cof-
fey, 2004a). The process was followed by an equally great increase in 
productivity, partly thanks to the new technologies, and partly because 
of the increase in workloads (Bacon and Blyton, 2007). Even if the steel 
industry remained highly unionised, the consequence of all these changes 
was a weakening of the influence of trade unions (Bacon and Blyton, 
2000; Stroud, 2010).
The steel industry is today dominated by MNCs from emerging econo-
mies. The largest companies are Chinese, Russian and Indian. Mittal Steel 
has emerged as the world’s largest (and most globalised) steel producer 
even before its merger with Arcelor (2006). It started (at that time under 
the name Ispat Indo (ispat meaning steel in Hindi) in 1976 as a small steel 
producer in Indonesia, founded by a young Indian businessman Lakshmi 
Mittal, who just had left his father’s Calcutta based Ispat Group (one of the 
Indian larger steel producer). His international expansion started as late as 
1989 when Ispat Indo acquired Trinidad’s state-owned Iscot. The essence of 
Mittal’s acquisition strategy, from the beginning, was to negotiate low ac-
quisition prices for companies that were state-owned, badly managed and in 
acute need of restructuring (Sull, 1999; Dawley, Stenning and Pike, 2008). 
This strategy was broadly supported by the favourable loans extended 
by the World Bank and other international financial institutions. In the case 
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of the acquisitions of plants from Eastern Europe (former Soviet Bloc) 
the most significant financial support came from World Bank develop-
ment project funds and: “The World Bank’s enthusiasm for Ispat knows 
few bounds” (Murphy, 2006). This made it possible for Mittal to buy the 
largest steel plant in Kazakhstan with production capacity of almost 5 mil-
lion metric tonnes/year (1995), Romania (2001), Czech Republic (2003), 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, three more plants in Romania as well 
as Poland’s largest steel producer with 7.6 million mt/year capacity (2004), 
and Ukraine’s leading producer with more than 9 million mt/year capacity 
(2005).1
The other important feature of acquisition strategy in the context of 
neoliberal privatisation of state-owned companies was the unusually close 
relation with governments, as well as rather controversial financial sup-
port to political parties (Murphy, 2006; Dawley, Stenning and Pike, 2008). 
Mittal, for one, was the largest donor to the UK’s Blair government for a 
rather long time, culminating with a £2m donation in 2005 (Woolf, 2005). 
However, the £125,000 donation of 2001 was most illustrative of this prob-
lematic “co-operation” between politics and capital, because it was fol-
lowed by Blair’s immediate intervention to help Mittal buy a Romanian 
steel company (Milner, 2004; Woolf, 2005). In sum, “Mittal’s companies 
operate across the globe, and have geographically shifting corporate iden-
tities, inclusive use of offshore registrations”. [At the same time] “[t]he 
company continues to be managed almost exclusively by people of Indian 
origin, though it has no operations in India” (Murphy, 2006: 141).
An illustration of this management strategy is the fact that all the 
above-mentioned acquisitions had been managed by two separate divisions 
of the Mittal group. Ispat International had mostly managed low-risk plants 
in Western Europe and the US, while LNM Holdings had managed riskier 
and more complicated plants in the “emerging markets” of Eastern Europe 
and rest of the world (Dawley, Stenning and Pike, 2008).
In order to be able to control the whole organisation, Mittal developed 
from the very beginning (1992, when Mexican Imexa was acquired) the 
so-called Knowledge Integration Program (KIP). Representatives from all 
Ispat plants started their four-day meetings twice a year. The purpose was 





periences (Sull, 1999). The purpose was also to transfer knowledge and 
experiences to the newly acquired companies (Sull, 1999: 372). This is 
presumably an answer to the question as to how Mittal Steel has managed 
to deal with so many companies from so many different countries, with so 
different historical and political/economical background.
While we have seen the integration of knowledge on the managerial 
level, on trade union level it is possible to identify a lack of knowledge 
about each other and a concomitant lack of any coordination and collabo-
ration. Generally speaking, it may be stated that trade unions have not 
managed to adapt their organisation and strategies to these new trends of 
privatisation, internationalisation and globalisation in the steel industry. 
Co-operation and coordination between trade unions still takes part in the 
first place at the national level, and less at the company level (Bacon and 
Blyton, 2000). The labour union themselves explain this by the language 
barriers, an inadequate communication network and not knowing whom 
to contact (Bacon and Blyton, 2000: 29). Such lack of co-operation and 
coordination at the company level facilitates the management in negotiat-
ing separate and different contracts with labour representatives from dif-
ferent plants within the company (Dawley, Stenning and Pike, 2008). This 
has sometimes led to conflict between different national labour unions, in 
which, for example, workers from Western Europe blame workers from 
Eastern Europe for “stealing jobs” (Dawley, Stenning and Pike, 2008: 280). 
This presumably further improves the negotiating position of the manage-
ment in this context. In terms of changes in working conditions, the main 
consequences of privatisation and internationalisation of the steel industry 
include decrease in available jobs, less favourable pension protection, re-
duction of job security and increased workloads.
There are a number of examples from Mittal’s history that support 
these findings (Dawley, Stenning and Pike, 2008). The intention of this 
article is to show what concrete form these changes and these trends have 
taken in the case of the acquisition and management of Mittal Steel Zenica 
(now ArcelorMittal Zenica). We introduce this with a short history of the 
Yugoslavian iron and steel industry.
Yugoslavian iron and steel industry
Although the socialist self-management system allegedly differentiated Yu-
goslavian socialism from state socialism in the CEE countries, they shared 
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the socialist developmental model, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
backbone of such a strategy was investment in heavy industry, especially 
iron and steel. After new estimates were made of considerable resources of 
iron ore, the government decided that central Bosnia would be developed 
into “the heavy industrial ‘core’ region of Yugoslavia” (Hamilton, 1964: 
47). Hamilton (1964) identified three trends in the development of the iron 
and steel industry in socialist Yugoslavia: further, yet slower development 
of already well-established plants in Slovenia; the establishment of a main 
metallurgical centre in Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the building 
of new plants in Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The global 
crisis of the steel industry in the 1980s and 1990s seriously affected plants 
in Yugoslavia. Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the outbreak 
of conflict, the various republics pursued different restructuring and priva-
tisation strategies. The Slovenian state supported the modernisation of the 
steel industry and simultaneously improved the production of high quality 
steel, while investing in energy-saving and ecologically friendly methods. 
Two state-owned steel works, Jesenice and Ravne, as well as the Store 
steel works, privatised by Slovenian firms, operate successfully, thanks to 
a smaller, more flexible production strategy. However, since 2007, the Slo-
venian state has sold the majority stake in the Slovenian steel group (SIJ) 
to the Russian group Koks, in spite of trade union protests.2 In Montenegro 
the Željezara Nikšić steel mill, which was initially to follow the Slovenian 
approach to restructuring, was purchased by Montenegro Specialty Steels 
B.V. (MNSS), a UK company registered in The Netherlands. While the 
owners and their origin have not been disclosed, the restructuring plans 
involving huge redundancies have led to trade union protests.3 In Croatia, 
the Italian Danieli Group bought the steel mill in Sisak and restarted pro-
duction in 2012. In Serbia, the government is still looking for a strategic 
partner following the unsuccessful sale of the Smederevo Steel Mill to US 
Steel, which sold the mill back to the state for One US Dollar. One of the 
potential buyers is ArcelorMittal, previously strongly opposed by Serbian 
trade unions.
However, Mittal Steel has succeeded in the acquisition of steel mills in 






est of former Yugoslav successor states. Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the FYR of Macedonia had already been politically divided and economi-
cally weakened by violent interethnic conflicts, and became the object of 
EU development programmes. Furthermore, Mittal Steel obtained EBRD 
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) financial support in 
restructuring projects in the FYR of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, just as in Ukraine, Romania and Kazakhstan.4
Steel industry in Zenica
Steel production in Zenica has a 118 years long tradition. During the period 
after WWII, Zenica became Yugoslavia’s largest steel producer, with the 
integrated production of steel at a capacity of ca. 2 million mt/year (it had 
never produced more than 1.5 million mt/year).
We have already noted that the steel industry in general has tradition-
ally consisted of large, badly managed state-owned companies, which have 
most often been rigid, inefficient, and unprofitable. Zenica’s plant was one 
such industrial giant with over 20,000 employees. Besides the core busi-
ness activity of steel production, the company was organised on the lines 
of a workers’ self-management model and was involved in other activi-
ties including a hotel and restaurant, transport provision and many other 
businesses. As well as being the town’s main job provider, Zenica steel 
was also the main contributor to the socio-economic development of the 
municipality.
Even prior to the War of 1992–1995, leaders of the company were in-
creasingly aware that such a rigid and ineffective organisation did not have a 
future. Significant restructuring in the company were obviously needed, but 
radical changes were initiated only when the war started, during which time 
less than 50% of the employees remained in the plant. Steel production was 
scaled down significantly, the primary objective being to preserve and pro-
tect the plant’s facilities. The coke plant was closed and preserved, as were 
all four blast furnaces. The war undoubtedly called for a comprehensive 
and innovative approach to post-conflict reconstruction, peacetime rebuild-
ing and development. Initially, the international strategy for reconstruction, 
jointly supported by the World Bank, the European Commission and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (World-Bank 
1996a, 1996b) was intended to combine the emergency reconstruction pro-
4 http://www.ebrd.com/pages/news/press/2005/158nov28.shtml.
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jects with conventional systemic transformation and reconstruction, in order 
to secure economic revival (Kreimer et al., 2000: 32). However, by 1998, 
because of the growing financial gap between “key objectives” and the 
funding resources, the concerted peace implementation was replaced by a 
strategy of rapid transition to a market economy inspired by the orthodox 
“shock therapy” approach (Likić-Brborić, 2009).
In Bosnia, this led to neo-liberal macroeconomic policy reforms fol-
lowed by increasing financial liberalisation and the restructuring and pri-
vatisation of 11 state banks (Likić-Brborić, 2009). The state refrained from 
industrial restructuring and decided to go for privatisation by methods of 
direct sales and international tenders for strategic companies, instead of 
insider privatisations.
This implied the absence of a strategic state capacity to restructure the 
steel industry in Bosnia and Herzegovina in general, and the Zenica steel 
works in particular. BH Steel was one of the three companies in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with FDIs, after Mittal Steel acquired a controlling share of 
BH Steel in 2004 (Holzner et al., 2006: 35). At the end of the 1990’s sig-
nificant restructuring began. Zenica first separated its core business of iron 
and steel production from all other businesses that operated in the company 
before the war. The core business was then taken over by the Government 
to be transferred into the newly established “BH Steel” in 1999. According 
to the new investment plan, the Government paid for the plant itself, which 
was 50% of the total cost, and the other 50% was provided by Kuwait’s 
government. The ambition was to re-start integrated production, but it was 
not an easy task for the new company. The coke plant and blast furnaces 
had been closed for almost ten years; markets and distribution channels had 
been disrupted; and, the new Kuwaiti owner did not have any experience 
in the steel industry. After five years it became clear that the BH Company 
did not have a future. It was put out to tender in 2004, and three potential 
overseas buyers registered an interest. Austria’s Alpina, which sent only 
a letter of intent, while LNM Holdings and Ispat International, both be-
longing to the Mittal Steel group, entered into more serious negotiations. 
Finally, the Government decided to sell its 51% share in the company to 
LNM Holdings Group. The newly acquired company was given the name 
Mittal Steel Zenica in 2004.
We now address the impact of the world’s largest transnational steel 
producing company and the influence of its global strategy on local em-
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ployment relations. Generally speaking, there are three competing theo-
retical views regarding the way in which MNCs manage organisation and 
human resources (HR) in their subsidiaries, as well as the local social, 
political and economic environment (Brewster, Wood and Brookes, 2008). 
One view is that globalisation results in convergence, with management 
practices across MNCs becoming increasingly similar. Secondly, theories 
state that companies operating within the same local market tend to adopt 
organisational practices that are dominant in that particular market, thus 
becoming “isomorphic” with other local organisations. Thirdly, there are 
so-called duality theories, which suggest that MNCs are simultaneously ex-
posed to the pressure to adapt to the local conditions, yet have to preserve 
corporate integrity aligned with their global nature.
Industrial relations and people management at Mittal Steel
Acquisition and its consequences
This section focuses on the relationships that have been established between 
the three major actors in our case, i.e., the new owner of the Mittal Steel 
Zenica, the state (Bosnia and Herzegovina Government) and employees in 
the company represented by their trade union. Mittal Steel came to Zenica 
as a saviour. Its internet home page proclaimed it as the “biggest ever in-
vestment in Bosnia by a foreign company”, placing it in a comfortable po-
sition both in terms of dealings with the government and with employees. 
The whole acquisition/privatisation contract included about 20 docu-
ments. One of them was an agreement on the so-called social package that 
was agreed and signed by the new owner and the local trade union branch. 
This and other contract documents obliged the new owner to employ at 
least 4,514 employees, to start integral production in the plant as soon as 
possible, to pay delayed payroll taxes and compensate workers for accu-
mulated unpaid wages from the previous period of employment. The new 
owner also promised to respect the existing collective agreement until the 
new one was signed. In return, the government made major investments in 
building an additional electric steel furnace plant with a capacity to produce 
700,000 – 800,000 tons of steel per year.
Electric steel furnace plants (mini-mills) have increasingly supplanted 
the traditional integrated steel production plants around the world (see for 
example Crandall, 1996; Konzelmann Smith, 1997; Bacon and Blyton, 
2001). They are more efficient, do not require such large investments and 
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make possible the adoption of innovative work practices that result in lower 
labour costs and higher labour performance (Bacon and Blyton, 2001).
Having acquired the new plant, and in spite of the promises made, 
Mittal Steel repeatedly delayed integral production, with the excuse that it 
required new investments that were too high, whilst at the same time the 
new electrical plant was being used to full capacity. In response to the in-
creasing price of electricity, Mittal’s management sought to reduce further 
their costs by dramatically cutting the workforce and equally dramatically 
increasing workloads, even though this was in direct contravention of the 
acquisition contract that had been signed by the local trade union.
A major problem related to the honouring of the agreements was the 
persistent lack of transparency in the process of privatisation. Under the 
“old system”, employment security (conditions of hiring and firing) and 
work security (safety and health rules, working time limits, night work 
etc.) were in general terms regulated by law and stipulated in the collec-
tive agreements between trade unions and employers. However, once the 
government of Kuwait acquired a 50% share of the company, the power of 
the union was severely undermined. According to law the collective agree-
ments could only be applied to companies with a majority of state capital, 
but in this particular case there was no majority owner. The company was 
neither private nor state-owned. To use the words of one of our informants: 
“Everyone was responsible and no one was responsible. It all depended on 
how you looked at it”.
The situation did not improve when Mittal took over as the majority 
owner, going on to pursue a HR strategy that limited their responsibilities 
to their employees and marginalised the trade unions.
Working conditions and work security
This had consequences in terms of work intensification, working condi-
tions in general, and workers’ health and safety in particular. Our inform-
ant explained that some production functions that used to depend on the 
manpower of 14–15 employees are today carried out by no more than 5–6 
employees. In negotiations about wages, the new management drove a hard 
bargain. The old job classification register was ignored, as was the protec-
tion equipment register and the register of jobs with difficult working con-
ditions. The latter was particularly important because workers doing these 
jobs qualified for retirement sooner than others.
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Nevertheless, according to local trade union representatives, it was 
rarely openly manifested as a flagrant violation of the agreement, done on 
purpose or by use of force. Instead, the employer would always find an 
excuse, (for instance, it was a result of the Government failing in its obliga-
tions towards the company, or, that the situation in the world steel market 
was too tough, and so on). Regarding the “old” job classification registers, 
the new management argued that these were left over from old communist 
regulations, and were not relevant any more.
The trade union, however, sees the situation differently:
... at the moment we still do not have any kind of job register. We find 
this situation both unacceptable and illogical because the new system 
has not brought any automation and/or modernisation. Everything is 
practically the same as before and there is no need for the removal 
of the old job structure. And besides, the old jobs register was made 
by independent companies that were specialised and competent just 
for this kind of evaluation. What the actual management tries to do is 
contrary to this. By engaging an internal service, which is part of the 
company’s own HRM office, to make a new job register they are, of 
course, going to protect the interests of the employer rather than the 
interests of the employees.
This generates, according to our informant, not only excessive work-
loads but more risk-exposure, with work intensification resulting in a lack 
of concentration, and a general lack of protective equipment and safety 
routines. He continued:
... In 2007 three workers were killed at a steel mill... they were suffo-
cated by argon. The fact was that it happened due to the catastrophic 
working and protection conditions. And we had complained about that 
all the time. They were lacking protective equipment. What was also 
lacking was a team that we called the draeger squad. Before the war 
there was always a draeger squad, which was ready to intervene at 
any moment … they were always the first ones on the scene when there 
was an emergency because they had the necessary training and equip-
ment for such situations. They used to clean installations, open up the 
gas, close the gas; and were there if the manpower was in difficulty 
and so on. They were re-introduced after the accident.
The preceding quote is not only a good description of the deteriora-
tion in working conditions, but also illustrates management’s sophisticat-
ed organisational strategies. They reduce their commitment to protecting 
employees to the barest minimum, but then give some concessions when 
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they have gone too far, as in this case by re-introducing the emergency 
teams.
Another point that we need to make here is that the trade union is far 
from having a weak sense of class interest or low self-confidence, even 
though Ost (2000) sees these as important properties of East European la-
bour. Representatives of Zenica’s steel workers clearly support path de-
pendence as opposed to shock therapy with regard to economic reforms in 
general and organisational changes in their company in particular.
These points are further illustrated below.
Marginalisation of the trade union and manipulation by HRM
One strategy deployed by management to overcome resistance to the changes 
imposed was to marginalise the local trade union, which seemed to be a 
stronger source of resistance than the new management had at first expected. 
The following quote is illustrative of the strategy deployed by the company:
And then they installed a new general manager, who came from South 
Africa, an Indian, who hardly knew what the union was. This caused a 
lot of trouble for us. We were forced to struggle for things that previ-
ously were self-evident; for example our right to collective bargaining, 
to sign a collective agreement. And then in the midst of it all they 
declared redundancies ... We, of course, tried to prevent it, and then 
they threatened to leave completely, with the consequence that we all 
would then lose our jobs. So the rights of workers were less and less 
respected; a particularly sensitive issue was work safety and health 
protection that dramatically worsened compared with the previous pe-
riod. They, however, viewed their way of dealing with these issues as 
if it was completely normal and unproblematic...
In their effort to belittle the local trade union, management even tried 
to establish English as the official language of communication between 
management and the trade union. Their argument was that as Mittal Steel 
Zenica had become part of a large global corporation where English is the 
official language, it was reasonable to expect all internal correspondence 
and oral communication to be in English. The trade union perceived this 
move as an attempt to dis-empower them in their negotiations. The resist-
ance was so strong that the management failed in its attempt.
Another way the management tried to marginalise the unions was to 
move the direct negotiations from local to national trade union representa-
tives. Our informant from the national trade union confederation said:
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… local trade union reps in the steel plant were obviously annoying for 
them, because they were consistent in their claims and always insisted 
even on the little things, … and then they [the management] tried to 
ignore them, and instead approached me, tried to negotiate a deal with 
me. But I always redirected them to the local union in the steel plant 
... I never allowed them to negotiate with me about the issues that 
concerned the local trade union.
Yet another tactic was to try and divide labour by fragmenting the 
membership in the trade unions. The targets were foremen, who were ob-
viously regarded as having a weaker labour class conscience than the or-
dinary workers.
They set up conditions for foremen which said they could either be fore-
men or members of a trade union... because a foreman is a member of 
the management. And they were even officially proclaimed managers. 
Imagine, ordinary foremen were promoted to managers,5 just to prevent 
them being members of the union. Just to reduce the membership...
Our informant explained that the management went to great efforts to 
persuade foremen to denounce the union and join them. It was a full-scale 
campaign. People were called to private phones in their free time and told 
that since they belonged to the company’s management, they would need 
to sign individual contracts with the company, which would, of course, be 
much better than the ones the trade union secured for them. Eventually, 
under relentless pressure, the majority of foremen agreed, but with damag-
ing consequences in terms of their own employment conditions:
… they are now totally dependent on the employer’s whims. The col-
lective agreement is not valid for them and those individual contracts 
that they signed proved to be very bad. Employers can now give them 
whatever kind of wages they want. Their contracts guarantee only the 
minimum hourly pay and a free meal every day. And nothing more, 
which means that they must work both night shifts and overtime, they 
must be available any hour of the day or night without any compensa-
tion for this. It’s terrible, but that is what they signed for…
Where local managers did succeed in advancing to the higher ranks 
of management at Mittal, with better contracts, they were seen by their 
employees as completely unscrupulous and remorseless in their treatment 
of shop-floor workers, and were clearly a source of bitter resentment for 
our informant:
5 The English word manager refers in the Bosnian language only to high company leaders.
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It is difficult to co-operate with them, they are worse than those foreign 
chiefs, who came with Mittal. I have a feeling that they would walk 
over corpses just to achieve their ends. I’ve said it publicly ... I’ve 
asked them, “How is it possible that you can live in Zenica, and walk 
this town and meet the people whom you have fired and left without 
a livelihood…”
As opposed to local managers, the few foreign senior managers who 
represent the Mittal corporation in Zenica, all of whom were from India, 
keep a low profile. They had real power over what was happening in the 
plant, but were almost invisible in the life of the local community:
… they act as if they do not live in this town at all, and it says a lot. 
There are not many of them here, four or five altogether. But they are 
not visible anywhere in the town, at the events, football matches for 
instance, or even at cultural events ... I wonder what they are doing, 
what they are so busy with, when they do not have time to appear out 
in the community…
What it is possible to conclude on the basis of the last two quotes is 
that Mittal did not and still does not want to be affected by local circum-
stances. The company apparently avoids having direct contact either with 
employees, the local community or with the Government. This job, some-
times sensitive and complicated, often difficult and characterised by con-
flict, is reserved for local managers. Meanwhile their foreign bosses, acting 
in the background, have the interests of the corporation as their priority.
Here we get an opportunity to address the relationship between ac-
tual corporate development within the steel industry and what is happen-
ing with trade unions. On the basis of the empirical evidence presented in 
this section of the paper, it is obvious that local trade unions face serious 
challenges in their efforts to protect the interests of their members. Most 
of the literature tends to seek the causes for this either in local political or 
historical circumstances or in the unsuccessful policy of the relevant inter-
national actors. Less attention is paid to the capital labour dynamics within 
the global steel industry as such. Research in this field shows, however, 
that the same kind of challenges face trade unions in the UK and Ger-
many (Bacon and Blyton, 2007), England and Poland (Dawley, Stenning 
and Pike, 2008), in the whole EU (Stroud, 2010), and even globally (Bacon 
and Blyton, 2000). The main problem is that on-going sector restructuring 
has resulted in the establishment of a smaller number of global corporations 
controlling the global market, while the trade unions are still nationally 
	 Zoran	Slavnić	et	al.:	From	Workers’	Self-management	in	Socialism...,	Revija	za	sociologiju	43	(2013),	1:	31–55
 49
focused on their organisation and strategies. The argument is made that 
steel unions need also to develop their international collective capacity in 
order to be able to meet their counterparts that already operate on a global 
scale (Stroud, 2010).
In the case of Mittal Steel Zenica, management cleverly use their global 
position to inform their approach to people management in Zenica. This is 
at least as important a factor in causing the weak and subordinated position 
of the local trade union as its local political and historical circumstances. 
Empirical material presented earlier supports this argument. There are signs 
however that the unions have managed to regain some power following the 
acquisition of another steel company, Arcelor.
... in the meantime they acquired Arcelor, which unlike Mittal had a 
strong and well-organised trade union. And then they were forced to 
respect the existing collective agreement between the trade union and 
Arcelor, which also became a part of the deal between Mittal and 
Arcelor.... And we have used this agreement, too; it helped us in our 
negotiations. So the management gradually began to change their be-
haviour. Among other things, they removed the head manager and re-
placed him with another one, also Indian, but with whom we could ne-
gotiate better. They even installed a new head of the human resources 
office, with whom it is also easier to co-operate.
Discussion
There are a number of issues that have been addressed in this paper. One 
of them is the consequences of transition. Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
widely devastated by the war, resulting in an ethnically divided, politically 
unstable and economically bankrupt society. What was not destroyed by the 
war, was declared irrelevant and abolished by neoliberal shock therapy, ex-
tensively deployed by the so-called international community after the war. 
All this resulted in Bosnia and Herzegovina being regarded as one of the 
least successful transitional countries, commonly described as illustrative 
of the “wild capitalism” model. The question is, however, whether “wild 
capitalism” accurately reflects the situation in Bosnia. Whilst wide-spread 
practices of ethnic politics, resulting in clientelism, corruption, and the rule 
of kleptocracy throughout the country are well documented in the literature 
(see Donais, 2002, 2003; Divjak and Pugh, 2008), these are not the most 
important characteristics of wild capitalism. More important is the fact that 
“corruption” and “criminal” social and economic practices and institutions 
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exist side by side with “normal” capitalism characterised by “legality, and 
‘western’ codes and norms of behaviour” (Upchurch and Marinković, 2011: 
14). This clearly corresponds to our empirical story. Mittal as a corporation 
is very careful to keep away from corruption and criminal activity. Whilst 
government representatives may be involved in such practices, they do not 
transgress into their dealings with the steel industry in general, or even 
less in their relations with Mittal. In their treatment of trade unions, both 
Government and Mittal show a strong tendency to avoid their responsibility 
to labour, but they do not employ criminal methods as part of the strategy. 
Their approach is more akin to the strategies of avoiding existing rules and 
regulations related to work and employment adopted by both companies 
and states in the West, a process described as informalisation from above 
(Slavnic, 2010).
Mittal’s organisational practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina may be 
described in this context as weak “institutional duality”. They are certainly 
affected to a degree by local actors and practices, but in reality they be-
lieve that their own practices, which they regard as “universal”, should be 
adopted by the host society, not the other way round. The story about their 
merger with Arcelor shows that they do not have the same attitude to rela-
tions with all their subsidiaries. The economic and political stability of the 
host society and organisational power of the subsidiary obviously play an 
important role in this context.
What can be said about the position of local trade unions? It is clear 
that they are not ashamed of their (socialist) past. They view themselves 
as responsible and loyal partners in the “old” system. (It was they that 
preserved and protected the plants’ facilities during the war and they are 
proud if it.) They want to be equally responsible and loyal now. At the 
same time they are increasingly aware that their position constantly be-
comes weaker. We argue, however, that this weakness cannot be explained 
only by national causes. We need also to include the development trends 
within the steel sector, both nationally and internationally. The last quote in 
this paper shows, however, that trade unions in Zenica have also become 
aware that they can increase their power only by moving the focus away 
from the national scale, and developing their organisational capacity on a 
company level.
A final issue that needs to be addressed here is what alternative kind of 
capitalism is to be expected in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mittal Steel would 
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presumably prefer the dependent variant, which is at the moment impossible, 
firstly because FDI in Bosnia and Herzegovina is still an insufficient part of 
the economy, and secondly because wild capitalism is too dominant in the 
rest of the economy and society. Paradoxically, at the moment the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina economy is protected from being dependent because it is 
consistently corrupt. The alternative to an unstable and corrupt society is a 
stable but economically dependent society. The question is: Is there any third 
option, and who will expedite it? This paper cannot answer this question, but 
hints at the role of internationally organised labour in such a solution.
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U radu se sustavno propituje preobrazba najvećeg proizvođača čelika u Bosni i 
Hercegovini iz državnog poduzeća u privatnu tvrtku u vlasništvu stranog kapita-
la. Istražuju se posljedice tranzicije na industrijske odnose, učinci novog načina 
upravljanja na radne uvjete u tvrtki te promijenjena uloga radničkih sindikata. 
Razmatra se u kojoj se mjeri nalazi mogu smatrati uobičajenim posljedicama 
neumoljivog prodiranja kapitalizma i privatizacije diljem istočne Europe. Na 
početku rada donosi se kratak pregled povijesnog i političkog konteksta tran-
zicijskih gospodarstava. Slijedi kratak pregled opće povijesti čelične industrije, 
posebice one u Jugoslaviji te Bosni i Hercegovini, zajedno s opisom glavnih obi-
lježja industrijskih odnosa. Potom se pozadina studije slučaja predočava putem 
kratke povijesti Mittal Steela i izazova njegova restrukturiranja u trazicijskome 
postkomunističkom razdoblju. To čini osnovu za analizu kojom se propituje utje-
caj privatizacije na industrijske odnose u tvrtki s naglaskom na snagu novog 
menadžmenta i njegove kulture, popratne učinke na radne ugovore, uvjete rada 
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i promijenjenu ulogu radničkih sindikata. Zaključno se raspravlja o tome u kojoj 
mjeri različite teorije postkomunističkog kapitalizma mogu objasniti te promjene.
Ključne riječi: čelična industrija, tranzicijska gospodarstva, postkomunistički ka-
pitalizam, divlji kapitalizam, ArcelorMittal, Mittal Steel
